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Sir Philip Sidney refers to Utopia as a “perfect way of patterning a Commonwealth” 
(117), which might easily be understood as a reference to Sir Thomas More’s 
exploration of Utopia’s utopia—that is, to book two of Utopia. It is, after all, in book 
two where More, through his character Raphael Hythloday, unfolds for his created 
courtly listeners the nature of this ideal commonwealth, Utopia. But Sidney does not 
limit his attention in his Defence solely to fine examples of works of poesy. Sidney, in 
making a defence for embattled poesy, argues the importance of attending both to 
poesy’s audience and to poesy’s “maker,” the poet, in evaluations of a work’s poetic 
worth. From our own acquaintance with Sidney’s several examples in the Defence that 
depict the intertwined involvement of the poet with his poesy and with his public, we 
know that not one of these three elements should be removed in favor of attending 
to any of them in isolation. Therefore, knowing that Sidney refers to the “whole 
Commonwealth” (117) as the particular audience he has in mind for More’s work, 
with our “erected wit” (Sidney 109), we do not misconstrue Utopia’s first book as of 
secondary importance for our evaluation. The gentlemen in book one are, after all, 
debating the plausibility of “correcting errors” (7) in their “own cities, nations, [. . .] 
and kingdoms” (7). Still, we leave ourselves with two possible avenues of 
investigation, which lead to opposite conclusions. If, falling prey to our “infected 
will” (Sidney 109), we make the mistake of following our initial impulse and focus on 
the second book, we judge Utopia as not fully satisfying Sidney’s requirements for 
poesy, for we cannot imagine ourselves being moved to imitate Utopians or their 
commonwealth. However, assuming Sidney’s Defence works to “move [. . .] us to do 
that which we know” (Sidney 123), with both books in mind, we find More very well 
practices what Sidney preaches: he creates in Utopia a work which could very well 
improve a whole commonwealth. 
Before exploring the basis for our investigation of Utopia—what Sidney believes 
a poetic work to be—we must first acknowledge that the relationship between the 
poet and his/her audience is not entirely absent as an interest from book two of 
Utopia. Admittedly, a teller—Raphael, as well as More’s created courtly listeners, are 
in a sense “there” throughout, but only emerge as the text’s primary subjects at the 
end of the work. Compared to the bulk of what constitutes book two, and compared 
with what book one provides, we are offered but a snippet of them. This snippet of 
Raphael and, in particular, his listener, the character Thomas More engaging with each 
other, is indeed worth notice, but considering what mostly constitutes book two, we 
may only know to take notice if we have not misconceived book one as merely 
introduction, and thus of lesser import. Something similar can be said of Sidney’s 
work: if we give scant attention to how Sidney begins his Defence of Poesy, perhaps 
imagining it as simply a device to persuade the reader to explore further on, we are 
likely to fail to attend well to Sidney’s John Pietro Pugliano. If we are guilty of this 
sin, we are however surely punished for it, for we would miss discovering how this 
key example of Sidney’s helps unlock the real worth of Utopia as a poetic work. 
Sidney both directly and indirectly tells us what poesy does, and what it is, several 
times in the text, usually in combination with attempts to distinguish poesy from two 
other disciplines, philosophy and history. In the midst of his argument where he 
promotes poets over philosophers, Sidney tells us that “the inward light each mind 
hath in itself is as good as a philosopher’s book” (123), and that “in nature we know 
it is well to do well, and what is well and what is evil” (123). Because learned men 
already know what the philosopher aims to teach, since poesy works to move “learned 
men [. . .] to do that which [they] [. . .] know, or to be moved with desire to know” 
(123), Sidney deems poesy superior to philosophy. Poesy moves men. To Sidney, that 
is what poesy does. 
In his refutation of the philosopher’s claim of superiority to the poet, Sidney also 
indirectly suggests what poesy is—that is, what it is about poesy that makes it move 
men—by drawing attention to the manner in which philosophers moralize. He 
presents us with a “perfect picture” (Sidney 116) of moral philosophers stepping 
forward to challenge him, “rudely clothed for to witness outwardly their contempt of 
outward things, with books in their hands against glory” (113). As Sidney claims that 
poesy is superior to philosophy because it would “win the goal” (116) through 
general precept and particular example, if we turn to the second book of Utopia with 
the details of this image of moral philosophers in our minds, we believe that Sidney’s 
striking image of the particular philosopher inhibits us from learning from More’s 
“general notion” (Sidney 116) (i.e., the overall conception) of Utopian moral 
philosophy. 
More tells us that Utopian moral philosophy is not disdainful of pleasure, even of 
sensual pleasure (56). They (the Utopians) in fact “think it is crazy for a man to 
despise beauty of form”(56). However, Sidney’s example of moral philosophers, 
because it excites our senses and creates a lasting memory for us to draw upon, 
conflicts with and ultimately overwhelms the impression this “fact” has upon us. His 
example, in fact, draws out details which complicate any easy assuming that Utopians 
are best understood as enjoying, rather than as being barely tolerant of, sensual 
pleasures. For example, we notice that More introduces the section on moral 
philosophy by telling us how Utopians are “amazed at the foolishness of any man 
who considers himself a nobler fellow because he wears clothing of a specially fine 
wool” (48), wherein we hear echoes of Sidney’s poorly clothed philosophers, 
criticizing glory. Further, though we are told that Utopians take pleasure in outward 
things, we are now primed to attend to the things they take little visual pleasure from, 
such as gold and silver, and little olfactory or gustatory pleasure from, such as food or 
drink. Since they take such pleasure in music, the privileged portal must be their 
ears—but still also their eyes, for though they ignore the glitter of precious metals, 
they do yet marvel at the stars (48). But again, another of Sidney’s perfect pictures 
springs to mind and intrudes in our reading of the text: Sidney has us imagining them 
as foolish philosophers so busy admiring the stars and attending to celestial music 
that they “might fall into a ditch” (113)! 
True, it may be argued that it is misleading to focus on Sidney’s ridicule of those 
who do, after all, “by knowledge [seek] [. . .] to lift up the mind from the dungeon of 
the body” (Sidney 113), when, referring to “the most barbarous and simple Indians” 
(105), he scornfully refers to these “Indians’” needing “to find a pleasure in the 
exercise of the mind” (105) lest “their hard dull wits [are never] softened and 
sharpened with the sweet delights of Poetry” (105). In Utopia, so the argument goes, 
since we also have “Indians” but who “[o]f all the different pleasures [. . .] seek 
mostly those of the mind” (More 55), surely considering Sidney’s disparaging remarks 
concerning “Indians” in the Defence we are likely to attend foremost to this 
discrepancy between Sidney’s “fact” and More’s “fiction” while formulating our 
impression of the Utopians. Exactly: we both attend to and wonder at this curiosity, 
and, as we will soon expand upon, not being children, we believe ourselves unmoved 
by it. Instead, Sidney’s image of the simply clothed priggish philosophers, because of 
its humorous exaggeration of a selection of characteristics we, being of a time when 
philosophers have “fallen” (103) “from almost the highest estimation of learning” 
(Sidney 103), might already be inclined to associate with philosophers, changes how 
we encounter the Utopians: we impose a clear and vivid counter-image on the one we 
composed from More’s descriptions, which makes them seem at least as prudish and 
absent-minded as aesthetically and practical minded. The result is that they seem less 
worthy of our emulation, and our conception of Utopia as a poetic work is lessened. 
Sidney offers another definition of poesy when he attempts to demonstrate 
poesy’s superiority to history. Here he does so through the use of a precept: poesy 
does not do what history does. History’s fashioners—historians—are “inquisitive of 
novelties [,] [which makes them] [. . .] a wonder to young folks” (114). So alerted, 
when we turn to More’s example of a utopia we note that each section has therein a 
particular novelty intended to both attract our attention and inspire our wonder. 
Within the section “Their Work Habits,” we learn that they devote only six hours 
each day to work (38)! Within the section titled “Social and Business Relations,” we 
learn that men at market take what they want without payment (41-42)! Within the 
section “Travel and Trade in Utopia,” we learn that “anyone who takes upon himself 
to leave his district without permission [. . .] is severely punished” (45)! Within the 
section on gold and silver, we learn that these metals have such little value (“which 
other nations give up with as much agony as if they were being disemboweled” [47]) 
that Utopians’ chamber pots are all made from these materials! And within the 
section on marriage customs, we learn that brides-to-be are shown unclothed to their 
grooms to ensure happily married couples! This utopia does a number of things 
Sidney believes good poesy does and that history does not do. It is set in a 
contemporaneous time (114). It is obviously not limited in conception to what “was” 
or even what is (120). It does offer us an example of a “house well in model” (116)—
that is, a well thought out and thorough presentation of a harmonious society for our 
consideration and critique. But learning from Sidney to attend to how we react to 
novelties which might capture a child-like mind, it is difficult for us to imagine 
ourselves as inspired enough to either create a better world (be moved to do) or to 
learn more about the Utopians (be moved with desire to know) after our encounter 
with More’s fictional commonwealth. 
However, our evaluation of how well Utopia conforms to what Sidney believes 
poesy is, and how it works, should not be influenced by our own reaction to More’s 
work. Further, we ought to take care not to judge ourselves unmoved simply because 
we think we think we haven’t been—i.e., there may be discord between what we know 
(gnosis) and how we actually behave (praxis). We will now both explain and explore 
the importance of these two self-administered checks on our initial rush to judgment, 
towards a way of seeing Utopia as serving rather well as a poetic work. 
Sidney does not believe that a work can be judged poetic before considering its 
effect on its intended audience, and we, though learned, are not the particular 
audience Sidney has in mind when he praises More’s work. Admittedly, Sidney does 
give some support for a conception of poesy which assumes that a certain reaction 
necessarily follows from experiencing a work of art. He uses the authority of Aristotle 
and his judgment of poesy as concerned “with the universal consideration” (119), to 
help augment the persuasiveness of his argument. However, he also takes care to tell 
us that, according to Aristotle, “the universal weighs what is said or done” (119), 
which, though literally meaning that everything said or done is evaluated against a 
constant truth, at least implies the well-reasoned state of mind of the poet who notes 
the inconstancies he sees and hears about him. Such a mind is Sidney’s, who we see 
refer to the effect poesy has on learned men, and hear warn of the effects of bad 
poesy—specifically, bare, unimproved history—has on uninformed, inexperienced 
listeners. Sidney understands that what moves a learned man would likely bore a 
child, and vise-versa. Sidney teaches us that a judgment of a work as poesy necessarily 
involves keeping the audience in mind; no art stands on merit alone. 
Indeed, we, as readers of the Defence, knowing its examples and arguments, 
should not be so unlearned as to focus our attention on Utopia’s second book. 
Instead, we attend to Sidney’s reference to Utopia in the Defence, note that Sidney 
praises More for fashioning a work which would aid the learned man best placed to 
shape a commonwealth, and know to judge Utopia an example of poesy on its ability 
to move such a man to get to work accomplishing it. We are well directed, then, to 
consider book one of Utopia in making our assessment, since influence at court 
constitutes its primary interest. 
We must acknowledge that Sidney does not refer to Utopia as a good example of 
poesy with which to influence a prince; rather, he says it is a good example with which 
to inspire a “whole Commonwealth” (117). However, in Utopia, when More (through 
his character More) says that for Raphael to maximize his influence he should aim to 
serve a prince, we have a characterization of a prince which should influence our 
reading of Sidney’s intended meaning here. More says, “a people’s welfare and misery 
flows in a stream from their prince, as from a never-failing spring” (8). He defines the 
prince as the source of societal destruction and of reconstruction. Sidney, both 
naturally as an Elizabethan courtier, and by example with his attempt to promote 
poesy as the sovereign discipline—unless we assume that Sidney is radical enough to 
imagine the poet capable of bypassing the king and transforming a commonwealth 
through a direct appeal to the people—shows that he shares More’s conception of 
the prince as key to any reinvigoration of a commonwealth. Since the prince has 
advisors to inform his judgment on, for example, matters of policy, we believe the 
advisor to a prince the particular audience Sidney has in mind when he praises Utopia. 
If the more radical alternative seems too tempting to leave unexplored, to help 
weaken its appeal, we refer our reader to Sidney’s praise for poesy’s ability to 
“beautify” (121) historians’ recitations of “counsel, policy, or war stratagem” (121), 
wherein we hear of both counsel and policy in a passage about the good service of 
advisers to princes. Of course, Raphael doubts some aspects of More’s 
characterization of the prince. For instance, he thinks a prince is best understood as 
someone who makes wars, not commonwealths (8), which, if we believe his 
accounting of princes over More’s own, might have us imagine a prince as completely 
uninterested in Utopia. Such a prince might find something in the Utopians’ war 
stratagems that interests and even inspires, but this sort of inspiration leads to the 
destruction of commonwealths, not their reconstruction. Raphael, though, never calls 
into question the actual power of a prince. His disagreement with More concerns the 
disposition of the prince, and therefore also the effectiveness of virtuous advisers at 
court, a subject we will soon discuss. 
Sidney offers an example of an encounter between a would-be poet trying to 
affect a learned man—Sidney himself—in the Defence; in fact, it serves as his 
introduction to the work. In the exordium, Sidney tells us of his encounter with John 
Pietro Pugliano, of Pugliano’s attempt to “enrich” (102) Sidney’s mind as to the 
greatness of his (Pugliano’s) placement as equerry at Emperor Maximilian II’s court. 
From attending to Sidney’s reaction to Pugliano, we note that the learned man is well 
aware of man’s tendency to enjoy self-flattery, of the length of time a teller takes in 
telling his tale, and of the possible relation of teller to listener as one of master to 
servant (102). Guilty of telling a drawn-out tale intended to promote himself and 
demean others (to make them want to be horses rather than their riders [102]), 
Pugliano is presented as an example of the inept poet for our consideration. 
Before we compare Sidney’s reaction to Pugliano with how we might imagine a 
particular sort of learned man—one who hopes to influence a prince—reacting to 
Utopia’s Raphael, it is important to note that Sidney clearly does not want to 
introduce his argument by boring his audience. That is, since Sidney wants to 
demonstrate poetry’s worth by engaging and familiarizing his learned audience with 
poesy’s art, he obviously assumes that the learned enjoy the playful ridicule of foreign 
(Italian) dignitaries. Presumably, the learned man, as with Sidney, also enjoys 
demonstrating that he has not been moved, not been “persuaded” (Sidney 102-03), 
remaining composed, contemplative, and critical of both the “poesy” and the “poet” 
after his encounter with them. Sidney suggests, though, that we can believe ourselves 
comported, feel ourselves unmoved, experience ourselves as wholly cognizant, yet 
still none the less find ourselves influenced and changed: that is, he suggests that the 
learned man can in fact be moved through bad poesy. Sidney, by example, 
demonstrates that he is himself sufficiently moved by his encounter with Pugliano’s 
poesy to make it the introduction to his Defence, and he implies that his experience 
with Pulgiano serves, along with the poor regard poesy is held in, as a springboard 
from which to investigate the nature of good poesy. 
The most prominent examples Sidney offers us of good poesy draw our attention 
as much or more to the poet, and the effect he has on his audience, as he does to the 
tale. We do not encounter in the Defence lengthy replicas of poesy; Sidney’s method is 
instead to wow us with the abilities of a singular individual, like Menenius Agrippa, 
who, “though he behaves himself like a homely and familiar poet” (125), so 
“masters” his audience that he creates “such effect in the[m] [. . .] that words [. . .] 
brought forth so sudden and so good an alteration” (125). Why is this? If we note 
that the effect Agrippa has on the Romans is as exaggeratingly characterized as 
Pugliano’s purported effect on Sidney (that it almost makes him wish himself a horse 
[102]) is, we see a pattern: Sidney’s account of Agrippa and the Romans makes him 
comparable in his storytelling “ineptness” to Pugliano. Indeed, in his Defence Sidney 
warns us early on that he, as with Pugliano, is presenting us with examples of “strong 
affection” (103) (i.e., his enthusiastic desire to persuade), which lead to the creation of 
“weak arguments” (103) (i.e., over-ripe accounts) out of good material. Unlike 
Pugliano, Sidney’s ineptness is deliberately fashioned to move his learned readers to 
embrace his argument. Sidney’s learned contemporaries might, at first, think most of 
the argument pure folly and judge it wholy unpersuasive (especially the claim that the 
playful poet is monarch over the philosopher!), but ultimately find themselves 
revisiting the memorably presented (with its humor and its daring) defence in their 
memory and perhaps too, finding some use in practice for the ideas Sidney puts 
forward. In sum, modifying an expression of Sidney’s, we can say that to Sidney “a 
[‘bad’] [. . .] example hath as much force to teach as a [‘good’] [. . .] example” (120), at 
least where the learned are concerned. 
It is in book one of Utopia that the learned reader who prides himself on his 
insusceptibility to foolery, perhaps due to being “a piece of a logician” (Sidney 102) 
himself, likely notes the discrepancy between the nature of a teller and his tale. The 
Utopians, who “actually practice” (26) “the kind of thing that Plato advocates in his 
Republic” (26), are described in book two as being rooted to their isle: it is their minds, 
“in their diligence and zeal to learn” (30), which “move” about. Yet Raphael, “eager 
to see the world” (5), is a sailor who, even after encountering the Utopians and 
claiming to be so impressed with them he “would never have left” (29), remains a 
man forever on the go, living, as he tells us, much as he pleases (7-8). The learned 
man, knowing his Greek, is sure to take pleasure in understanding why Raphael 
Hythloday is to be understood, in part, as a “speaker of non-sense.” As with the 
Defence, this likely leaves the narrator—who in this case is also the character Thomas 
More—who remains a sceptic, and who remains in part unmoved, unconvinced at 
“story’s” end, as the person the learned reader is most likely to sympathize and 
identify with. 
At the end of book two More tells us he would like to challenge Raphael on a 
point, but, noting that Raphael “was tired of talking” (84), and as More remains 
unsure whether Raphael “could take contradiction in these matters” (84), instead 
placates him with praise and leads him on to dinner. This odd foreign storyteller 
Raphael, with his over-lengthy tale, consisting of interesting but often absurd ideas, 
and with his imperial but clownish persona, clearly is a delight to More. Raphael is 
harmless; he is not given the authority to win his argument with More that, even 
delivered with skillful attendance to the particular likes and dislikes of court, it is 
impossible to give good ideas a fair hearing at court. Instead, much as with Sidney’s 
Pugliano, we learn that a good way of passing on new ideas to courtiers is to frame 
them within a story dealing with topics of clear interest, such as an Italian courtier 
and fine horses in the Defence, or of strange peoples and their strange worlds in Utopia, 
but to create room for the learned listener to distance himself from the teller and his 
tale so he doesn’t feel manipulated into experiencing our would-be poet as 
“monarch” (Sidney 123) and himself as subject. Good advice to win the ear, mind, 
and heart of an advisor, as well as for him to gain the attention, consideration, and inspiration of 
a prince. “Entertain” (7) the prince, and offer him a “supply of examples” (More 7) to 
discard, and he might just keep some with him, perhaps to help re-invigorate a 
“fallen” commonwealth once considered worthy of the “highest estimation” (Sidney 
103). 
Utopia—if we include both its first and second books—is well framed to both 
entertain an advisor and inform his address to a prince. It is also well stocked with 
suggestions that could be refined into promising policy changes that would help 
improve a commonwealth. Utopia is a work of poesy. And if we consider the sort of 
literature that follows Utopia in sixteenth-century England, such as Spenser’s Faerie 
Queen and Shakespeare’s comedies (with their “green worlds”), it may well be that 
Sidney’s precept for good poesy, along with More’s fine example of it, moved at least 
some learned men to attempt to influence a prince. Their “prince,” after all, unlike 
Raphael’s sketch of a prince from which so much followed, was both acquainted with 
and interested in much more than simply “the arts of war” (More 8): Queen 
Elizabeth, that is, was very much interested in re-constituting—and thereafter 
maintaining—a stable commonwealth out of one divided by (religious) strife. 
One last thing needs to be addressed before we part. We have only explained 
why we believe that, after a close look at both of Utopia’s two books, we find Utopia 
corresponds to what Sidney, by both what he directly states and what he indirectly 
shows, believes qualifies a work as poetic. We have told you we know to inform our 
judgment with a close look at both books of Utopia, and revealed the conclusion we 
believe follows from having done so. However, we have not exempted ourselves 
from willfully preferring to stick with our initial impulse and make our assessment 
primarily based on Utopia’s second book. Why is this? Because, since we only claimed 
we learned from Sidney’s argument, and only acknowledged that we were moved by 
its parts, not by its whole, to make such an assessment would require an exploration 
not of how well Utopia satisfies Sidney’s definition of what poesy is, but rather how 
well Sidney’s Defence itself works as a poetic construction. That is, we would need to 
explore how well the Defence moves us to do what we now know we ought to do. We 
will gladly explore this with you, but at another time, as we have already talked so 
much, kept you overlong, and burdened you with many novelties. And besides, we 
feel sure that “another such [. . .] opportunity will present itself some day” (More 85).  
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